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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2280 
___________ 
 
KAREEM HASSAN MILLHOUSE,  
Appellant 
v. 
 
B.A. BLEDSOE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 10-cv-01974) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 12, 2012 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
    Opinion filed: January 20, 2012  
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Pro se appellant Kareem Milhouse appeals from the District Court’s April 8, 2011 
order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm. 
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I. 
 Milhouse
1
 is a federal prisoner incarcerated at USP Lewisburg.  On May 14, 2009, 
at 11:38 a.m., the Lieutenant of the prison’s Special Management Unit (“SMU”) entered 
Milhouse’s cell and ordered him to submit to hand restraints so that he could be moved to 
another cell.  When Milhouse refused to comply, a Use of Force team entered the cell to 
remove him.  Upon Milhouse’s continued refusal to comply, the team “deployed less than 
lethal foam baton munitions” and Milhouse was eventually placed in ambulatory 
restraints and removed from his cell.  
 An Incident Report (“Report”) was delivered to Milhouse the following day at 
noon.  He was charged with Refusing a Program Assignment, Refusing an Order, and 
Threatening Staff
2
 in violation of several sections of the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) 
disciplinary code.  An investigation was conducted on May 18th, and the investigating 
officer noted that the investigation had not occurred within 24 hours of the incident due 
to the lack of qualified staff working over the weekend.  On May 20, 2009, the Unit 
Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”) reviewed the Report and referred the charge to the 
DHO.  At that time, Milhouse was notified of his rights at the disciplinary hearing, which 
                                              
1
 Because the Appellant refers to himself as “Milhouse” rather than “Millhouse” (as his 
name is spelled in the case caption), we will do the same.  
 
2
 The Government notes that this charge was not sustained, as the Disciplinary Hearing 
Officer (“DHO”) determined that the officers had erroneously attributed threatening 
statements to Milhouse rather than to another inmate who was also being removed from 
his cell.  
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include having a staff member represent him and calling witnesses.  Milhouse requested 
that Lieutenant Fosnot act as his staff representative and listed two staff members as 
witnesses.  In making these requests, Milhouse focused on proving that he did not 
threaten staff members and that he did not receive the Report within 24 hours of the 
incident occurring.  He requested only that Lieutenant Fosnot review video footage to 
prove that that the investigating officer did not deliver the Report to him and to prove that 
he did not make any threatening statements.  He believed that the witnesses (both staff 
members) would also establish that he did not threaten staff members. 
 Milhouse’s DHO hearing began on June 23, 2009.  He claimed that he did not 
receive the Report within 24 hours of the incident occurring, and asked that it be 
expunged.  He also asserted that he did not make threatening statements, but admitted 
that he had refused to obey the order to submit to hand restraints and change cells.  The 
DHO declined to expunge the Report because the record reflected that Milhouse had 
received the report at 12:00 p.m. on May 15, 2009, and because he acknowledged 
receiving written notice of the charge more than 24 hours before the DHO hearing.  The 
hearing was continued to allow the DHO and Lieutenant Fosnot to review the videotape 
of the incident.  The hearing resumed on July 7, 2009, at which point Milhouse was 
found to have committed the prohibited act of refusing an order in violation of Code 307.  
He was sanctioned to 15 days of disciplinary segregation as well as the loss of: (a) 14 
days good conduct time, (b) 120 days of commissary privileges, and (c) 120 days of 
visiting privileges.  
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  In 2010, Milhouse filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition alleging that his constitutional 
rights were violated in the disciplinary proceedings which resulted in the loss of good 
conduct time.  He asserted that he should not have been removed from his cell because he 
was no longer on a hunger strike and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the 
charge of refusing to obey a staff order because the order was improper.  He also claimed 
that his procedural rights were violated because he did not receive the Report within 24 
hours of the incident’s occurrence.  The District Court denied Milhouse’s petition on 
April 8, 2011.   
 Milhouse now appeals. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard 
to its findings of fact.  Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002).  A 
complaint challenging the loss of good time credits is cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  
Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 “[A] prisoner has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in good time credit.” 
Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991).  Thus, a prisoner facing the loss of 
good-conduct time as a result of an infraction is entitled to certain procedural protections 
in the disciplinary proceedings.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974).  The 
minimum required protections are: “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary 
charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional 
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goals, to call witnesses and present documentary in [the inmate’s] defense; and (3) a 
written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the 
disciplinary action.”  Superintendant v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).   Additionally, the 
DHO’s findings must be supported by some evidence in the record.  See id. at 455. This 
standard “does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of 
the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.  Instead, the relevant question is 
whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by 
the disciplinary board.”  Id. at 455-56.   
 Milhouse maintains that there was insufficient evidence for the disciplinary charge 
of Refusing an Order.  In particular, he asserts that he never should have been subject to 
the order because he had already ended the hunger strike that was apparently the impetus 
for the forced cell change.  However, the District Court properly declined to consider this 
argument because Milhouse did not raise it before the DHO.  See McPherson v. McBride, 
188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999).  Further, for the reasons given by the District Court, 
the DHO’s decision that Milhouse committed the Code 307 violation meets the “some 
evidence” standard.  See Hill, 472 F.3d at 455-56.  
 Milhouse also reiterates his claim that his rights were violated because he did not 
receive notice of the charges within 24 hours after the incident occurred.  As the District 
Court explained, under the then-applicable regulations, the prison staff was to “give each 
inmate charged with violating a Bureau rule a written copy of the charge(s) . . . ordinarily 
within 24 hours of the time staff became aware of the inmate’s involvement in the 
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incident.”  28 C.F.R. § 541.15(a).  Inmates are also to receive “advance written notice of 
the charges . . . no less than 24 hours before the inmate’s appearance before the [DHO].”  
28 C.F.R. § 541.17(a).  See also Young, 926 F.2d at 1399 (stating that a prisoner “must 
receive written notice of claimed violations at least 24 hours in advance of the hearing”).  
We discern no error in the District Court’s conclusion that Milhouse received the Report 
and notice of the charge in accordance with the regulations.  Additionally, we note that 
even if the regulation had been violated, its violation is not actionable in this case.  
Milhouse cannot show that his right to due process was violated by a technical non-
compliance with a regulation where any delay did not prejudice him.  See Wilson v. 
Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 380-81 (3d Cir. 2003).  Also, Milhouse has not shown that the 
regulation itself created a liberty or property interest such that its alleged violation 
abridged his due process rights  See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995).   
 Milhouse’s remaining arguments are meritless.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
District Court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. 
 
